Monitors or Predators: The Influence of Institutional Investors on Sell-Side Analysts
Monitors or Predators: The Influence of Institutional Investors on Sell-Side Analysts
复制标题
DOI：
10.2308/accr-50263
复制
发表时间：
2013-01-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Yang, Yong George
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gu, Zhaoyang;Li, Zengquan;Yang, Yong George
监管机构和投资界一直担心，机构投资者通过收取交易佣金向金融分析师施压，要求他们发表乐观意见，支持自己的股票头寸。我们使用了一个独特的数据集，该数据集确定了共同基金公司将交易佣金费用分配给各个经纪商，并提供了关于这个问题的直接证据。特别是，我们发现，对于股票，基金公司采取了大量的立场，分析师更乐观，在他们的股票推荐时，他们的经纪人收到交易佣金从这些基金公司。当佣金压力更大时，这种关系更强。市场对面临更大佣金压力的分析师的“强烈买入”建议的反应不那么积极。各基金在调整投资组合时也对这些建议作出消极回应。这些结果指出了在文献中很少探讨的分析员偏倚的来源。
Regulators and the investment community have been concerned that institutional investors pressure financial analysts through trading commission fees to issue optimistic opinions in support of their stock positions. We use a unique dataset that identifies mutual fund companies' allocation of trading commission fees to individual brokerages and provide direct evidence on this issue. In particular, we show that for stocks in which the fund companies have taken large positions, analysts are more optimistic in their stock recommendations when their brokerages receive trading commission fees from these fund companies. The relationship is stronger when the commission fee pressure is greater. The market reacts less favorably to the "Strong Buy'' recommendations of analysts facing greater commission fee pressure. The funds also respond negatively to such recommendations in making portfolio adjustments. These results point to a source of analyst bias that has been little explored in the literature.