Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms
Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms
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顺序谈判机制
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511528309.009
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Cramton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Cramton
本章中的介绍性讨论考虑了最简单类型的序贯讨价还价游戏，其中参与者的时间偏好由已知且固定的折扣率来描述。我开始的特点类完美的谈判机制，满足理想的属性的激励相容性（即，每个玩家如实地报告他的类型），个人理性（即，每个潜在的参与者都希望玩游戏），以及顺序理性（即，随着时间的推移所引起的机制由另一种机制支配，这从来不是常识）。结果表明，事后效率是不可能获得的任何激励兼容和个人理性的机制时，讨价还价者不确定他们是否应该立即交易。最后，我发现这些机制，最大限度地提高球员的事前效用，并表明，这种机制违反了顺序理性。因此，如果讨价还价者能够在他们知道自己的私人信息之前承诺一个机制，那么他们在事前的情况会更好。在他们的事前收益方面，如果卖方的延迟成本高于买方，那么讨价还价者最好采用序贯讨价还价博弈而不是静态机制;然而，当买方的延迟成本更高时，那么静态机制是最优的。
The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in which the players' time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable by any incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism when the bargainers are uncertain about whether or not they should trade immediately. I conclude by finding those mechanisms that maximize the players' ex ante utility, and show that such mechanisms violate sequential rationality. Thus, the bargainers would be better off ex ante if they could commit to a mechanism before they knew their private information. In terms of their ex ante payoffs, if the seller's delay costs are higher than those of the buyer, then the bargainers are better off adopting a sequential bargaining game rather than a static mechanism; however, when the buyer's delay costs are higher, then a static mechanism is optimal.