China's Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights
China's Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights
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发表时间：
2015-01
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通讯作者：
J. Gan;Yan Guo;Chenggang Xu
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作者：
J. Gan;Yan Guo;Chenggang Xu
中国民营化的一个显著特点是其设计和实施都是高度分散的，由地方政府管理。本文基于对中国100多个城市3,000家企业的调查，研究了城市政府如何在不同的私有化方式中进行选择，这些不同的方式如何将控制权从政府转移到私人所有者，以及不同的私有化方式如何导致不同的重组和绩效。我们的数据表明，尽管中国的私有化在将控制权从政府重新分配给私人所有者方面取得了实质性进展，但不同私有化方法对公司决策的剩余政府影响程度存在显著差异。更重要的是，政治和财政限制决定了城市政府如何私有化的决定。政治上反对裁员较少、政府财政能力较强的城市倾向于选择内部人直接销售（MBO）作为私有化方式，这种方式将控制权最完全地转移给私人所有者。因此，管理层收购公司的重组最有效，并取得最大的绩效改善。
A distinct feature of China’s privatization is that both its design and its implementation are highly decentralized and are administered by the local governments. Based on a survey of 3,000 firms in over 100 Chinese cities, this paper studies how city governments choose among various privatization methods, how these different methods transfer control rights from the government to private owners, and how various privatization methods lead to different restructuring and performance. Our data indicate that although privatization in China has made substantial progress in reallocating control rights from the government to private owners, the degree of remaining government influence in corporate decisions across different privatization methods varies significantly. More importantly, political and fiscal constraints critically determine city governments’ decisions on how to privatize. Cities with less political opposition to labor shedding and where the government has stronger fiscal capacity tend to choose direct sales to insiders (MBOs) as the privatization method, which transfers control rights to private owners most completely. As a result, MBO firms restructure most effectively and achieve the greatest performance improvement.