Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises
Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises
复制标题
跨境银行危机中的财政负担分担
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Schoenmaker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Goodhart;D. Schoenmaker
本文主要研究破产银行的资本重组问题。如果社会效益（保持系统稳定）超过资本重组的成本，资本重组就是有效的。在一个国家的背景下，最佳政策的实施相对简单。但在跨界环境中，人们面临着可能的协调失败。使用一个多国模型，它表明，事后谈判负担分担导致资本调整不足。接下来，我们探讨不同的事前负担分担机制，以克服协调失败。第一种是由参与国集体供资的一般性计划（一般性负担分摊）。第二种是将负担与要调整资本结构的银行的资产所在地联系起来（具体负担分摊）。这两个机制的运作是根据欧洲大型跨境银行的数据进行校准的。由于成本和收益在具体方案中更好地结合，因此能够更好地克服协调失败。JEL代码：E58，E60，G21，G28。
This paper focuses on the recapitalization of failing banks. A recapitalization is efficient if the social benefits (preserving systemic stability) exceed the cost of recapitalization. In a national setting, the implementation of an optimal policy is relatively straightforward. But in a cross-border setting, one is confronted with possible coordination failure. Using a multicountry model, it is shown that ex post negotiations on burden sharing lead to an underprovision of recapitalizations. Next, we explore different ex ante burden sharing mechanisms to overcome the coordination failure. The first is a general scheme financed collectively by the participating countries (generic burden sharing). The second relates the burden to the location of the assets of the bank to be recapitalized (specific burden sharing). The working of the two mechanisms is calibrated with data on large cross border banks in Europe. Because the costs and benefits are better aligned in the specific scheme, it is better able to overcome the coordination failure. JEL Codes: E58, E60, G21, G28.