ARTICLES“P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief
ARTICLES“P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief
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文章“P 和我会相信非 P”：理性信念的历时约束
作者：
L. Bovens
There exist two versions of Moore's paradox: (1) for some arbitrary proposition P, there is something queer about my asserting that P and I do not believe that PI and (2) for some arbitrary proposition P, there is something queer about my asserting that P and I believe that not-P.2 The former is Hintikka's Moore's paradox3 and the latter is (with some qualification) Wittgenstein's Moore s paradox.4 On the assumption that a rational person does not hold contrary beliefs, the assertion in (2) is stronger than the assertion in (1), since my believing that not-P entails my not-believing that P, but not vice versa. Hence, if there is something queer about my asserting that P and I believe that not-P, then a fortiori there is something queer about my asserting that P and I do not believe that P. Moore substitutes a past-tense doxastic attitude in the assertion in (1) and points out that the air of paradox disappears: for some arbitrary proposition P, there is nothing queer about my asserting that P but I did not believe that P.' Neither is there anything queer about my asserting that P but I did believe that not-P. In either case, the listener will simply infer that I changed my
