A Theory of Managed Trade
A Theory of Managed Trade
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管理贸易理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Staiger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Bagwell;R. Staiger
本文提出了一个理论，该理论预测在“正常”贸易量期间，低水平的保护与贸易量激增时的“特殊”保护相结合。这种动态的保护模式来自一个模型，在这个模型中，各国在面对剧烈的贸易波动的反复博弈环境中选择保护水平。高贸易量导致单边背离合作关税水平的动机更大。因此，随着贸易量的扩大，在合作均衡中，保护水平必须提高，以减缓贸易量的增加，并抑制对缺陷的激励。
This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game setting facing volatile trade swings. High trade volume leads to a greater incentive to unilaterally defect from cooperative tariff levels. Therefore as the volume of trade expands, the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check.