Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation
Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation
复制标题
通过市场实验学习的动态双头垄断
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Jullien
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Aghion;M. P. Espinosa;B. Jullien
摘要本文分析了在面临需求不确定性的寡头垄断产业中，学习行为如何实质性地改变竞争结果。我们考虑的情况下，一个对称的双寡头博弈，企业有不完全的市场需求信息，并通过观察他们的销售量学习。本文的主体在于展示市场实验如何解释寡头垄断行业中价格分散的存在。我们研究这种现象及其动态演变的背景下，霍特林双寡头模型，然后我们扩展到一般的需求函数和N-公司寡头垄断的分析。我们讨论了市场需求信息的公共利益方面的一些影响。最后，我们对寡头垄断行业中信息价值为负时会发生什么进行了一些评论。
SummaryThis paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.