The history of state pensions in the UK: 1948 to 2010

The history of state pensions in the UK: 1948 to 2010
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英国国家养老金的历史:1948年至2010年

DOI:
10.1920/bn.ifs.2010.00105
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发表时间:
2010
期刊:
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
G. Tetlow
G. Tetlow
中科院分区:
医学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Antoine Bozio;Rowena Crawford;G. Tetlow

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本简报介绍了英国从1948年《贝弗里奇报告》之后的基本国家养老金开始,到2007年《养老金法案》和保守党/自由民主党联合政府的计划的国家养老金提供情况。主要目标是全面说明目前确定养恤金福利的规则以及过去已经实施的规则。然而,我们也提供了政策制定者在考虑养老金改革时面临的困境的简要历史概述,并对最近的改革进行了总结。英国养老金制度的历史就是一个以非缴费为主的制度的故事,它不时受到社会保险计划更高的替代率的诱惑,但一旦成本变得明显,就总是感到恐惧。最近的改革进一步向全民统一费率福利的方向倾斜,放弃了任何社会保险设计。这证实了英国国家养老金制度的主要目标是减少老年贫困。这些统一费率的养老金还将减少该制度对经济状况调查福利的依赖,在一定程度上加强了该制度的贝弗里奇式设计。鉴于上述说明,不幸的是,最近的改革仍试图维持原有体系的大部分复杂结构,而不是对其进行改革和合理化。然而,一旦过渡问题得到处理,规则的表述可能仍有简化的余地。*本文件由财政研究所ESRC公共政策微观经济分析中心资助(RES-544-28-5001)。作者感谢卡尔·埃默森对本简报早期草稿的有用评论,并感谢朱迪思·佩恩的文案编辑。所有剩余的错误都由作者负责。
This Briefing Note describes state pension provision in the United Kingdom from the inception of the basic state pension in 1948, following the Beveridge Report, to Pensions Act 2007 and the plans of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government. The main objective is to provide a comprehensive description of the rules that currently determine pension benefits as well as those that have been in place in the past. However, we also provide a brief historical overview of the dilemmas facing policymakers when contemplating pension reforms and a summary of the most recent reforms. The history of the UK pension system is the story of a mainly non-contributory system, periodically tempted by the higher replacement rate of social insurance schemes, but always frightened once the costs become apparent. Recent reforms have tilted the system further in the direction of a universal flat-rate benefit, abandoning any social insurance design. This confirms that the main objective of the UK state pension system is to reduce poverty at old age. These flat-rate pensions will also reduce the reliance of the system on means-tested benefits, somewhat reinforcing the Beveridgean design of the system. Given these clarifications, it is unfortunate that the latest reforms have still sought to maintain much of the complex structure of the pre-existing system instead of reforming and rationalising it. However, once issues of transition have been dealt with, there may yet be scope for simplifying the presentation of the rules. * This paper was funded by the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (RES-544-28-5001). The authors would like to thank Carl Emmerson for useful comments on an earlier draft of this Briefing Note and Judith Payne for copy-editing. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.