THE PROBLEM OF VOLUNTARINESS AND COERCION IN THE NEGOTIATED PLEA
THE PROBLEM OF VOLUNTARINESS AND COERCION IN THE NEGOTIATED PLEA
复制标题
谈判抗辩中的自愿与强迫问题
DOI:
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发表时间:
1979
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
C. Brunk
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
C. Brunk
This paper focuses on the narrow question whether prosecutorial or judicial negotiation of a reduced charge or sentence for a criminal defendant in exchange for a guilty plea renders the plea "involuntary." I begin by clarifying the conditions under which choices in general are considered voluntary or coerced. In Part II, I measure the practice of plea bargaining against this general theory of voluntary choice. I argue that a negotiated guilty plea is not intrinsically involuntary but that many of the conditions commonly a part of plea bargaining may render it so. The negotiated plea can be defended from the charge of coercion only if these conditions can be, and are, eliminated. I also show that overt "threats" of prosecutorial or judicial reprisal are not the only way of coercing a guilty plea. Under certain conditions, apparent "offers" of leniency can be coercive as well. The past few years have witnessed an intensified debate over the propriety of the practice of plea bargaining. This debate has ranged over a broad spectrum of questions, such as whether the practice is consistent with due process and equal protection of law and with the theoretical assumptions of the adversarial process, whether it undermines the accuracy of trials, whether it reduces respect for the judicial process, and whether it places a burden on the right to trial or impinges upon the right against self-incrimination. In addition to these considerations of procedural fairness, some critics have argued that the practice is unfair to society because it produces sentences so lenient that they defeat the aims of the criminal justice system (Kipnis, 1976). Although most of these are important and profound ques