Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the United States
Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the United States
复制标题
美国的私人利益和交叉上市
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.462027
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Schmidt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Schmidt
在本文中，我们回顾了在美国的私人利益和交叉上市的文献。我们首先讨论用于衡量私人利益的替代方法。我们调查了最近的证据，记录了跨国公司管理人员获得的私人利益水平的差异，以及与高和低私人利益相关的国家特定因素。然后，我们解释了如何通过交叉上市的股票在一个市场，如美国的高披露和监管标准，一个公司可以承诺在未来相对较低的私人利益水平。我们讨论的情况下，经理人会选择交叉上市的股票在美国，当这样的交叉上市有重要的影响，经理人的私人利益。最后，我们调查了最近的实证研究，测试这种结合的交叉上市的观点的实证意义。总的来说，这一证据提供了一个令人信服的理由，即希望保护股东的权利以便利进入股票市场是公司选择在美国交叉上市的若干原因之一。
In this paper, we review the literature on private benefits and cross-listings in the United States. We first discuss the alternative approaches used to measure private benefits. We survey recent evidence documenting cross-country differences in the levels of private benefits obtained by corporate managers, as well as the country-specific factors associated with high and low private benefits. We then explain how, by cross-listing its stock in a market with high disclosure and regulatory standards such as the United States, a firm can commit to a relatively low level of private benefits in the future. We discuss the circumstances under which managers would choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States, when such a cross-listing has important implications for managers' private benefits. Finally, we survey recent empirical work that tests empirical implications of this bonding view of cross-listings. Overall, this evidence provides a compelling case that the desire to protect shareholders' rights so as to facilitate access to equity markets is one of a number of reasons why firms choose to cross-list their stocks in the United States.