Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil: Presidentialism, federalism, and governance in Brazil
Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil: Presidentialism, federalism, and governance in Brazil
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并行选举，不一致的结果：巴西的总统制、联邦制和治理：巴西的总统制、联邦制和治理
DOI：
10.2307/422421
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发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
David J. Samuels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David J. Samuels
“为候选人做演讲已经成为过去，这是一种修辞手法。如今，如果你做广告说你要投票给这个或那个候选人，那不会改变任何事情。”因此，巴西总统费尔南多·恩里克·卡多佐于1998年8月3日表示，他相信他的支持无助于在圣保罗州选举其他职位的候选人。1999年1月，卡多佐成为第一位将总统腰带传给自己的巴西总统。 1998 年 10 月，他在第一轮连任选举中取得了压倒性的胜利，以超过 20% 的优势击败了最接近的对手。他的联盟中的政党也在国会两院赢得了相当大的多数席位。按理说，卡多佐的连任理应使他为维持巴西经济稳定计划（“钢琴雷亚尔”）和通过广泛的政治改革而做出的努力重新焕发活力。除了相对轻松获胜所带来的声望之外，国际货币基金组织在选举后不久就同意向巴西提供 420 亿美元，为卡多佐提供额外的政治和经济喘息空间以进行改革。从表面上看，卡多佐在第二任期开始时似乎拥有重要的政治资本。然而，卡多佐并没有经历第二次蜜月。相反，他的第二个任期开始时就像一场噩梦。在他就职后的几周内，雷亚尔崩溃了，价值损失了一半，并引发了人们对巴西重返臭名昭著的恶性通货膨胀时代的担忧；该国的外汇储备被耗尽；两位央行行长相继辞职；巴西股市暴跌；当选为重要州米纳斯吉拉斯州州长的前总统伊塔马尔·佛朗哥实际上拖欠了该州欠国内和国际债权人的债务。这最后一根稻草迫使中央政府偿还债务，以避免出现普遍政府违约的感觉。 《纽约时报》很快得出结论，尽管卡多佐获胜，“巴西正在努力应对多年来最严重的金融危机。”此外，作为拉丁美洲最大的经济体和世界第八大经济体，巴西的麻烦在整个地区产生了反响。警惕的投资者担心巴西的问题可能会引发“新的全球动荡”，甚至引发“全球金融崩溃”。2巴西的经济危机引发了政治危机，卡多佐就职后在选民和国会中的政治威望迅速下滑。3卡多佐的第二次蜜月为何如此突然缩短？虽然许多人认为
"Stumping for candidates is a thing of the past, it's a figure of speech. These days, if you advertise that you're going to vote for this or that candidate, it doesn't change anything." So Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso expressed his belief that his support would not help elect candidates for other offices in O Estado de Sao Paulo, August 3, 1998. In January 1999 Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to pass the presidential sash to himself. He won a smashing first-round reelection victory in October 1998, defeating his nearest rival by over 20 percent. The parties in his alliance also won sizable majorities in both houses of congress. By all rights, Cardoso's reelection ought to have rejuvenated his efforts to maintain Brazil's economic stabilization program (the Piano Real) and to pass extensive political reforms. On top of the prestige from his relatively easy victory, the International Monetary Fund agreed soon after the election to provide Brazil with U.S.$42 billion to give Cardoso extra political and economic breathing room to maneuver for reform. Superficially, Cardoso appeared to possess significant political capital at the start of his second term. However, Cardoso experienced no second honeymoon. To the contrary, his second term began as a nightmare. Within weeks of his inauguration, the real collapsed, losing half its value and raising fears of a return to Brazil's infamous days of hyperinflation; the country's foreign currency reserves were drained; two central bank presidents resigned in succession; the Brazilian stock markets went into a free-fall; and former president Itamar Franco, elected governor of the important state of Minas Gerais, effectively defaulted on the debts his state owed to domestic and international creditors. This last straw forced the central government to cover the debts in order to stave off the perception of a generalized government default. The New York Times soon concluded that despite Cardoso's victory "Brazil is struggling against its worst financial crisis in years."' Moreover, as the largest economy in Latin America and the eighth largest in the world, Brazil's troubles reverberated throughout the region. Leery investors feared that Brazil's problems could unleash "new global turmoil" or even precipitate a "global financial meltdown."2 Brazil's economic crisis generated a political crisis, and after his inauguration Cardoso's political prestige quickly slipped with both voters and congress.3 Why was Cardoso's second honeymoon cut short so abruptly? While many fac-