The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
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DOI：
10.1038/s41598-020-64930-4
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
H. Ozono;Yoshio Kamijo;Kazumi Shimizu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Ozono;Yoshio Kamijo;Kazumi Shimizu
在社会困境中，如果个体能从群体中的同伴那里得到有效的奖励或惩罚，那么合作就能持续下去。然而，随着群体规模的增加，我们不可避免地面临本地化问题，即一个全球群体被分成几个本地化群体。在这样的社会中，成员只能奖励和惩罚同一局部群体内的邻居，而社会困境的合作应该通过全球群体参与来解决。在这种情况下，全球群体和当地群体在福利方面并不总是平等的，并且可能出现合作对全球群体有利而对当地群体不利的情况。我们预测，在这种局部效率低下的情况下，同伴奖惩无法维持全球合作。我们进行了一个实验，让16个小组成员玩一个包含同伴奖惩的公共物品游戏。我们操纵了同伴奖惩范围（仅本地成员/所有全球成员）和报酬结构（局部有效/局部无效）。我们发现，当且仅当群体被划分为局部群体，且回报结构在局部效率低下时，就无法实现高度合作，同伴奖惩也无法发挥作用。
Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. In such societies, members can reward and punish only neighbors within the same localized group, while cooperation for social dilemmas should be solved through global group involvement. In this situation, the global group and the local group are not always equal in terms of welfare, and situations can arise in which cooperation is beneficial for the global group but not for the local group. We predict that in such a locally inefficient situation, peer reward and punishment cannot function to sustain global cooperation. We conducted an experiment in which 16 group members played a public goods game incorporating peer reward and punishment. We manipulated the range of peer reward and punishment (only local members/all global members) and payoff structure (locally efficient/locally inefficient). We found that high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.