The Ombud and Own-Initiative Investigation Powers
The Ombud and Own-Initiative Investigation Powers
复制标题
监察员和自行调查的权力
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-40612-7_5
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
C. Gill
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Gill
本章主张监察员应被赋予主动调查权。理由有四：国际上的普遍性和成功经验；有关投诉行为和未出现争议的证据；有关弱势群体代表性不足的证据；并确定由自身主动权产生的明确的附加值贡献。本章探讨了如何校准和构建自己的主动权。分析了国际惯例，包括调查触发因素、调查标准和常见调查主题。本章考虑了反对自主权的三个论点——“繁文缛节”、“使命漂移”和“流氓监察员”论点——并建议每一个论点都可以通过适当的立法框架来回答。本章的结论是，需要广泛的权力，并通过平衡问责制和有效性的报告要求进行控制。
This chapter argues that the ombud should be granted own-initiative powers of investigation. The case for this is four-fold: prevalence and successful experiences internationally; evidence in relation to complaining behaviour and the non-emergence of disputes; evidence in relation to under-representation of vulnerable groups; and identification of clear added-value contributions arising from own-initiative powers. The chapter explores how own-initiative powers should be calibrated and framed. International practice is analysed on investigation triggers, criteria for launching investigations and topics commonly investigated. The chapter considers three arguments against own-initiative powers—the “red-tape”, “mission drift” and “rogue ombud” arguments—and suggests that each of these can be answered through appropriate legislative framing. The chapter concludes that broad powers are required, controlled through reporting requirements that balance accountability and effectiveness.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
Buck Trevor
通讯作者：
Buck Trevor