Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.631703
复制
发表时间：
2004-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Atif R. Mian;A. Khwaja
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Atif R. Mian;A. Khwaja
政治上有关系的人的腐败往往被归咎于经济弊病，特别是在欠发达经济体。使用超过90，000家公司的贷款水平数据集，代表了1996年至2002年期间巴基斯坦企业贷款的宇宙，我们调查了银行业中与政治有联系的公司的租金。如果一个公司的董事参加了选举，我们将其归类为“政治性”的，我们研究了政治租金提供的程度，性质和经济成本。我们发现，政治性公司的借款额高出45%，违约率高出50%。这种优惠待遇只发生在政府银行，私人银行不提供政治优惠。使用公司的固定效应和利用变化为同一家公司跨贷款人或随着时间的推移允许更干净的识别的政治偏好的结果。我们还发现，政治租金的增加与企业的政治家的实力，无论他或他的政党是在执政，并与他的选区的选举参与程度下降。我们提供了直接的证据，反对其他的解释，如社会动机的政府银行贷款给政客。据估计，租金的整体经济成本每年占GDP的0.3%至1.9%。
Corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills, particularly in less developed economies. Using a loan-level data set of more than 90,000 firms that represents the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, we investigate rents to politically connected firms in banking. Classifying a firm as "political" if its director participates in an election, we examine the extent, nature, and economic costs of political rent provision. We find that political firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks—private banks provide no political favors. Using firm fixed effects and exploiting variation for the same firm across lenders or over time allows for cleaner identification of the political preference result. We also find that political rents increase with the strength of the firm's politician and whether he or his party is in power, and fall with the degree of electoral participation in his constituency. We provide direct evidence against alternative explanations such as socially motivated lending by government banks to politicians. The economy-wide costs of the rents identified are estimated to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year.