Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-11925-5_21
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发表时间：
2010-03
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cho
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文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cho
PRESENT 是一种面向硬件的分组密码，适用于资源受限的环境。本文采用多维线性密码分析方法对PRESENT进行分析。我们声称我们的攻击可以在 31 轮中的最多 25 轮中恢复 PRESENT 的 80 位密钥，数据复杂度约为 262.4。此外，我们还表明，通过先进的密钥搜索技术，26 轮版本的 PRESENT 可以比具有 264 数据复杂度的密钥穷举搜索更快地受到攻击。我们的结果优于之前所有的攻击。我们通过对 PRESENT 的简化变体执行线性攻击来证明我们的结果。我们的结果表明，多维线性攻击的性能优于经典线性攻击。
PRESENT is a hardware-oriented block cipher suitable for resource constrained environment. In this paper we analyze PRESENT by the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis method. We claim that our attack can recover the 80-bit secret key of PRESENT up to 25 rounds out of 31 rounds with around 262.4data complexity. Furthermore, we showed that the 26-round version of PRESENT can be attacked faster than key exhaustive search with the 264data complexity by an advanced key search technique. Our results are superior to all the previous attacks. We demonstrate our result by performing the linear attacks on reduced variants of PRESENT. Our results exemplify that the performance of the multidimensional linear attack is superior compared to the classical linear attack.