Taxation and the Allocation of Talent
Taxation and the Allocation of Talent
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DOI：
10.1086/693393
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发表时间：
2016-04
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Ben Lockwood;Charles G. Nathanson;E. Weyl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ben Lockwood;Charles G. Nathanson;E. Weyl
税收削弱了物质激励，从而放大了追求“使命”的非金钱激励，从而影响了人才在各行各业的分配。根据文献估计，高薪职业具有负外部性，而低薪职业具有正外部性。因此，一个经过校准的模型规定，中产阶级收入的边际税率为负，而富人的边际税率为正。实施这一政策所带来的福利收益很小，与特定职业的税收和补贴所带来的收益相比，更是相形见绌。这些结果主要取决于外部性估计和跨职业的劳动力替代模式，鉴于现有的经验证据，这两者都非常不确定。
Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a “calling.” Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the rich. The welfare gains from implementing such a policy are small and are dwarfed by the gains from profession-specific taxes and subsidies. These results depend crucially on externality estimates and labor substitution patterns across professions, both of which are very uncertain given existing empirical evidence.