Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
复制标题
广义中位选民方案的单峰性和策略证明
DOI：
10.1007/s355-002-8331-1
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Dolors Berga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dolors Berga
抽象的。我们确定，在一个连续的多维框架中，一个最大的偏好域兼容的策略证明一个给定的广义中位数选民计划。事实证明，这些域是单峰的变体。Barberà等人（1999）已经得到了一个类似但更强的关于离散情况和单峰的结果。然而，这两个结果是独立的，他们的证明涉及不同的参数。
Abstract. We identify, in a continuous multidimensional framework, a maximal domain of preferences compatible with strategy-proofness for a given generalized median voter scheme. It turns out that these domains are a variation of single-peakedness. A similar but stronger result for the discrete case and single-peakedness has been already obtained by Barberà et al. (1999). However, both results are independent and their proofs involve different arguments.