Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism
Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism
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DOI：
10.1017/s0020818305050125
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发表时间：
2005-03-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Dai, XY
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dai, XY
各国为什么要遵守国际协定？虽然学者们做了大量的工作，以解决遵守和执行在国际游戏，较少的分析注意到国内机制的遵守。然而，由于国际协定具有国内分配后果，因此存在国内执行来源。在本文中，我提出了一个国内问责制分析框架，其中确定了国内选民可以影响国家遵守的具体影响渠道。使用博弈论模型，我表明，政府的合规决策反映了选举杠杆和国内选区的信息状态。这一框架进一步为国际机构为什么以及如何通过国内机制影响国家的遵守提供了理论依据。欧洲酸雨制度为国内选区的论点提供了一个经验性的例证。
Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. in this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where 1 identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument.