An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation
An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation
复制标题
迭代广义维克瑞拍卖：策略验证，但没有完全揭示
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Parkes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Parkes
广义维克里拍卖（GVA）是一种策略证明的组合拍卖，其中真实出价是代理的最优策略。在本文中，我们解决了 GVA 的一个基本问题，即它要求代理计算并揭示其所有项目组合的值。对于计算有限或成本高昂的有界理性智能体来说，这可能非常困难。我们提出了迭代组合拍卖的实验设计。我们有理论证明，拍卖在特殊情况下实现了维克里拍卖的结果，并且初步的实验结果支持了我们的猜想，即拍卖在所有情况下都实现了维克里拍卖的结果。拍卖具有比密封投标 GVA 更好的信息属性：在每一轮中，代理必须仅对在给定当前要价的情况下最大化其效用的一组捆绑进行投标，这不需要代理计算每个捆绑的确切价值。
The generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) is a strategy-proof combinatorial auction, in which truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for an agent. In this paper we address a fundamental problem with the GVA, which is that it requires agents to compute and reveal their values for all combinations of items. This can be very difficult for bounded-rational agents with limited or costly computation. We propose an experimental design for an iterative combinatorial auction. We have a theoretical proof that the the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in special cases, and initial experimental results support our conjecture that the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in all cases. The auction has better information properties than the sealedbid GVA: in each round agents must only bid for the set of bundles that maximize their utility given current ask prices, which does not require agents to compute their exact values for every bundle.