When can you trust "trust"? Calculative trust, relational trust, and supplier performance
When can you trust "trust"? Calculative trust, relational trust, and supplier performance
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DOI：
10.1002/smj.2374
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发表时间：
2016-04
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
L. Poppo;K. Zhou;J. Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Poppo;K. Zhou;J. Li
我们的研究经验性地评估了信任的两个不同基础：计算性信任，基于奖励和惩罚的结构，相对于关系信任，一种基于过去行为的判断，其特征是共享身份。我们发现，计算信任和关系信任的供应商绩效的积极影响，计算信任有更强的关联比关系信任。然而，存在重要的边界条件。如果买方投资于特定于供应商的资产，或者当供应方市场的不确定性很高时，关系信任，而不是计算信任，与供应商绩效的关系更密切。相比之下，当行为的不确定性高，计算的信任，而不是关系的信任，与供应商的绩效更强。这些结果强调了研究不同形式的信任的价值。版权所有© 2015约翰威利父子有限公司
Our research empirically assesses two distinct bases for trust: calculative trust, based on a structure of rewards and penalties, versus relational trust, a judgment anchored in past behavior and characterized by a shared identity. We find that calculative trust and relational trust positively influence supplier performance, with calculative trust having a stronger association than relational trust. Yet, important boundary conditions exist. If buyers invest in supplier-specific assets or when supply side market uncertainty is high, relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly associated with supplier performance. In contrast, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, not relational trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance. These results highlight the value of examining distinct forms of trust. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.