Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market.
Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market.
复制标题
寡头垄断力量对价格支持政策设计重要吗？
DOI：
10.1111/agec.12560
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kumse;K.;Suzuki;N. and Sato;T.
在寡头垄断市场中，假设完全竞争会产生严重偏差的结果，农民可能会收到低价和政策分析。在本文中，我们估计了加工商和农民之间的寡头垄断力量，并评估了稻米质押计划（PPP）的福利影响，这是泰国茉莉香米市场上一项慷慨的价格支持计划，具有不完全竞争模型。我们开发了一个由大米供应方程和衍生需求方程组成的模型。然后，我们使用系统估计方法同时估计这些方程，以恢复寡头垄断功率参数。最后，我们使用这些参数来评估价格支持计划的福利影响。利用 2001/2002 年至 2015/2016 年农作物营销年度的年度面板数据，并利用 PPP 的制度特征，我们发现了强有力的证据，表明存在一定的寡头垄断力量、适度的寡头垄断价格扭曲以及价格支持与寡头垄断力量之间的负相关关系。我们还发现，PPP在收入再分配方面效率低下但有效。此外，该计划对农民和消费者都有好处。通过更好的决策，PPP 可以通过设定合适的支持价格来提高效率。因此，我们的研究结果表明，就泰国茉莉香米市场而言，普遍接受的农产品价格支持政策的“智慧”并不一定成立，可以设计价格支持来提高市场效率。
In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.