Dynamic Tolling for Inducing Socially Optimal Traffic Loads
Dynamic Tolling for Inducing Socially Optimal Traffic Loads
复制标题
用于诱导社会最佳交通负载的动态收费
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Sastry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Maheshwari;Kshitij Kulkarni;Manxi Wu;S. Sastry
如何设计通行费，以诱导社会最优的交通负荷，动态到达的旅客做出自私的路线决定？本文提出了一种双时间尺度的离散时间随机动力学模型，该模型能自适应地调整平行线路网络上的收费价格，同时考虑到进出站旅客及其路线选择引起的交通负荷的更新。在我们的动态中，载荷和通行费的更新具有三个关键特征：(1)进出旅客的总需求是随机实现的；(2)旅行者的目光短浅和自私，他们根据当前平行线路的延迟和通行费的扰动最佳响应来选择路线；（三）与更新负荷相比，更新收费的时间较慢。结果表明，负荷和通行费最终集中在固定点附近，这对应于社会最优负荷和通行费价格。此外，定点负荷对于收费来说也是一个随机的用户均衡。我们的研究结果可以为交通管理部门有效地管理交通负荷以响应旅客的到达和离开提供有用的信息。
How to design tolls that induce socially optimal traffic loads with dynamically arriving travelers who make selfish routing decisions? We propose a two-timescale discrete-time stochastic dynamics that adaptively adjusts the toll prices on a parallel link network while accounting for the updates of traffic loads induced by the incoming and outgoing travelers and their route choices. The updates of loads and tolls in our dynamics have three key features: (i) The total demand of incoming and outgoing travelers is stochastically realized; (ii) Travelers are myopic and selfish in that they choose routes according to a perturbed best response given the current latency and tolls on parallel links; (iii) The update of tolls is at a slower timescale as compared to the the update of loads. We show that the loads and the tolls eventually concentrate in a neighborhood of the fixed point, which corresponds to the socially optimal load and toll price. Moreover, the fixed point load is also a stochastic user equilibrium with respect to the toll price. Our results can be useful for traffic authorities to efficiently manage traffic loads in response to the arrival and departure of travelers.