Non-executive employee ownership and financial reporting quality: evidence from Europe
Non-executive employee ownership and financial reporting quality: evidence from Europe
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DOI：
10.1007/s11156-022-01058-8
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发表时间：
2022-04-13
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Jelic, Ranko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Adwan, Sami;Alhaj-Ismail, Alaa;Jelic, Ranko
本文研究了非执行董事持股与财务报告质量之间的关系。该分析使用了2006年至2017年期间在11个欧洲国家上市的非金融公司样本。我们发现，非执行员工持股和财务报告质量之间存在正相关。此外，我们发现，这种积极的关联对于在以下环境中运营的公司更为明显：工会密度更高，行业同行公司更多，劳动力市场法规更灵活。总体而言，这些研究结果支持这样的观点，即员工持股通过两个渠道使员工的利益与股东的利益保持一致，从而提高财务报告的质量：减少代理问题和提高员工保留率。本文的研究为研究股权特征对财务报告激励的影响提供了理论依据。它强调了非执行员工所有权在改善公司治理和财务报告质量方面的作用。
This paper examines the association between non-executive employee shareholding and financial reporting quality. The analysis is conducted using a sample of non-financial firms listed in eleven European countries between 2006 and 2017. We find a positive association between non-executive employee ownership and financial reporting quality. Furthermore, we find this positive association to be more pronounced for firms operating in the following settings: higher labour union density, more industry peer firms and more flexible labour market regulations. Overall, these findings support the view that employee shareholding enhances the quality of financial reporting by aligning the interests of employees with those of shareholders through two channels: reduced agency problems and enhanced employee retention. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of ownership characteristics on financial reporting incentives. It underscores the role non-executive employee ownership can play in improving a firm's corporate governance and therefore the quality of financial reporting.