On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations
On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2021.105207
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发表时间：
2021-02-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Tao, Yixin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cole, Richard;Tao, Yixin
无嫉妒和帕累托效率是福利经济学的两大目标。满足这两个条件的分配的存在性已经研究了很长时间。无论物品是不可分割的还是可分割的，即使是两个人两个物品的情况，也不可能实现无嫉妒和事后帕累托效率。相反，在这项工作中，我们证明了，对于任何基数效用函数（包括互补效用，例如）和任何数量的项目和球员，总是存在一个事前混合分配，这是无嫉妒和帕累托有效的，假设允许的分配满足匿名性质。在可分的情况下，这个问题仍然是开放的。我们还研究了寻找帕累托有效和无嫉妒分配的通信复杂性。(c)2021爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to achieve envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency ex post even in the case of two people and two items. In contrast, in this work, we prove that, for any cardinal utility functions (including complementary utilities for example) and for any number of items and players, there always exists an ex ante mixed allocation which is envy-free and Pareto Efficient, assuming the allowable assignments satisfy an anonymity property. The problem remains open in the divisible case.We also investigate the communication complexity for finding a Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocation. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.