Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries
Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.005
复制
发表时间：
2014-06-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Hessami, Zohal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hessami, Zohal
本文探讨了政治腐败与公共支出构成之间的关系。寻租模型用于描述通过公共支出的构成来创造政治租金。 1996年至2009年期间29个经合组织国家的实证结果表明了政治腐败：公共支出分配给以非竞争性行业提供的高科技产品为特征的支出类别，与透明国际提供的腐败感知指数（CPI）呈正相关。以前有关政府腐败的文献主要集中在低收入国家。这项研究的结果表明，政治腐败也是经合组织国家的一个问题。 (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. 保留所有权利。
This paper examines the relation between political corruption and the composition of public spending. A rent-seeking model is used to describe political rent creation through the composition of public spending. Political corruption is indicated by empirical results for 29 OECD countries for the period 1996-2009: allocation of public spending to expenditure categories characterized by high-technology goods supplied by non-competitive industries varies positively with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International. Previous literature on corruption in government has focused on low-income countries. The results of this study suggest that political corruption is also an issue in OECD countries. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.