Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: How Important is Forward Looking Behavior?
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: How Important is Forward Looking Behavior?
复制标题
健康保险中的道德风险:前瞻性行为有多重要?
DOI:
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发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
M. Cullen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Aviva Aron;L. Einav;Amy N. Finkelstein;M. Cullen
We investigate whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the non-linear pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that employees who join an employer-provided health insurance plan later in the calendar year face the same initial ("spot") price of medical care but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price than employees who join the same plan earlier in the year. Our results reject the null of completely myopic behavior; medical utilization appears to respond to the future price, with a statistically significant elasticity of medical utilization with respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To try to quantify the extent of forward looking behavior, we develop a stylized dynamic model of individual behavior and calibrate it using our estimated behavioral response and additional data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Our calibration suggests that the elasticity estimate may be substantially smaller than the one implied by fully forward-looking behavior, yet it is sufficiently high to have an economically significant effect on the response of annual medical utilization to a non-linear health insurance contract. Overall, our results point to the empirical importance of accounting for dynamic incentives in analyses of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization.
影响因子:
1.5
作者:
Kowalski,AmandaE
通讯作者:
Kowalski,AmandaE
DOI:
10.1093/qje/qjr013
发表时间:
2011-05-01
期刊:
The quarterly journal of economics
影响因子:
--
作者:
Chetty R;Friedman JN;Olsen T;Pistaferri L
通讯作者:
Pistaferri L