ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection
ImpedanceVerif: On-Chip Impedance Sensing for System-Level Tampering Detection
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DOI：
10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.301-325
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发表时间：
2022-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tahoura Mosavirik;P. Schaumont;Shahin Tajik
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文献类型：
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作者：
Tahoura Mosavirik;P. Schaumont;Shahin Tajik
物理攻击可能会损害加密设备的安全性，具体取决于攻击的要求，对手可能需要（i）在集成电路（ICS）软件包的距离中放置问题系统的PCB，或（iii）与PCB的组件，芯片包装或替换整个PCB的物理上，以准备攻击。检测对系统的物理访问，它们的高生产成本和与旧系统的不兼容，使它们在本文中没有吸引力。使用基于芯片电路的网络分析仪的系统发电网络（PDN）可以检测到各种篡改事件。对系统的修改可以在FPGA上部署，以提取PDN的频率响应。一家商业开发套件家族，并对进行不同的侧通道或故障攻击所需的各种类别的PCB和IC软件包进行了广泛的测量。我们将Wasserstein距离作为统计指标，进一步表明我们可以确保检测到我们的结果。可以使用芯片阻抗感测定包装。
Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.