The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
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最低审批机制从理论上和实验上实现了公共物品的高效配置

DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.003
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发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
and Tatsuyoshi Saijo
and Tatsuyoshi Saijo
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Takehito Masuda;Yoshitaka Okano;and Tatsuyoshi Saijo

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