Network formation and anti-coordination games
Network formation and anti-coordination games
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DOI：
10.1007/s001820400178
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发表时间：
2004-12-01
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Vega-Redondo, F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bramoullé, Y;López-Pintado, D;Vega-Redondo, F
我们研究了一个设置中，个别球员选择他们的合作伙伴，以及在2 × 2反协调游戏的行为模式-游戏中，一个球员的最佳反应是选择一个行动，不像她的合作伙伴。我们描述了平衡网络，以及研究网络结构对个人行为的影响。我们的分析表明，网络架构和诱导行为都在很大程度上取决于形成链接的成本值。在一般情况下，平衡配置被发现既不是唯一的，也不是有效的。
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games - games where a player's best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient.