SIGNALING IN SECRET: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND THE INCENTIVE AND SORTING EFFECTS OF PAY SECRECY
SIGNALING IN SECRET: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND THE INCENTIVE AND SORTING EFFECTS OF PAY SECRECY
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DOI：
10.5465/amj.2012.0937
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发表时间：
2014-12-01
影响因子：
10.5
通讯作者：
Bamberger, Peter A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Belogolovsky, Elena;Bamberger, Peter A.
尽管绝大多数美国公司都遵循薪酬保密政策，但研究对其对组织的整体效用的了解有限。在信号理论的基础上，我们开发并测试了薪酬保密的激励和分类效应模型。薪酬保密是一种薪酬沟通政策，它限制了员工获得与薪酬相关的信息，并阻碍了对薪酬问题的讨论。多轮实验室模拟的结果在很大程度上支持所提出的有调节的中介模型。他们指出，薪酬保密对个人任务绩效有不利影响，这种影响是由PFP感知介导的，当薪酬确定标准是相对的（而不是绝对的）时，这种影响会放大，当绩效评估是客观的（而不是主观的）时，这种影响会减弱。结果还表明，薪酬保密对参与者的延续意愿也有类似的不利影响（通过PFP感知介导，当薪酬确定标准是相对的时放大，当绩效评估是客观的时减弱），特别是在高绩效者中。这些发现表明，当在其他基于实践的信号的背景下解释时，与特定管理实践相关的弱信号可能变得突出，并且在这种情况下，即使是弱信号也可能驱动负面导向的推论，具有重要的行为影响。
Although the vast majority of U.S. firms follow a policy of pay secrecy, research provides a limited understanding of its overall utility to organizations. Building on signaling theory, we develop and test a model of the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy-a pay communication policy that limits employees' access to pay-related information and discourages the discussion of pay issues-under varying pay-for-performance (PFP) system characteristics. Results of a multiround laboratory simulation largely support the proposed moderated-mediation model. They indicate that pay secrecy has an adverse impact on individual task performance that is mediated by PFP perceptions, amplified when pay determination criteria are relative (as opposed to absolute), and attenuated when performance assessment is objective (as opposed to subjective). Results also indicate that pay secrecy has a similar adverse effect on participant continuation intentions (mediated through PFP perceptions, amplified when pay determination criteria are relative, and attenuated when performance assessment is objective), particularly among high performers. These findings suggest that weak signals associated with a particular managerial practice may become salient when interpreted in the context of other practice-based signals and that, under such conditions, even weak signals may drive negative-oriented inferences, having important behavioral implications.