Intercontinental-airport regulation
Intercontinental-airport regulation
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洲际机场监管
DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2013.03.001
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
S. Proost
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wim Benoot;J. Brueckner;S. Proost
本文分析了洲际机场监管机构之间的战略互动，每个监管机构都征收航空公司支付的机场费用，并在拥挤条件下选择机场容量。洲际航班的拥堵在洲际机场很常见，因为出发和到达机场是一对一连接的，而纯粹的国内交通也使用每个机场。本文着重探讨了两个问题。首先，如果两大洲都能从战略上为国内航班和洲际航班分别设定机场收费标准，那么结果与第一个最佳解决方案有何不同？第二，服务于洲际市场的航空公司的市场力量如何影响战略性机场行为？我们看到，监管机构的战略性机场定价和容量选择导致了福利损失：监管机构在洲际航班市场上都表现得像竞争者，收取加价和减少容量。这种福利损失甚至掩盖了洲际航空市场不完全竞争可能产生的负面影响。我们进一步讨论了如何在一个大陆上的多个监管机构或一个简单的定价规则的存在可能会限制战略机场监管所造成的福利损失。
This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.