Social Interactions and Legislative Activity
Social Interactions and Legislative Activity
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社会互动和立法活动
DOI：
10.1093/jeea/jvac051
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Trebbi, Francesco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Canen, Nathan;Jackson, Matthew O.;Trebbi, Francesco
我们开发了一种社会互动模型，以及依赖于此类社会活动的战略互动模型，并用它来衡量立法过程中的社会互补性。我们的模型允许在关系形成中存在党派偏见和同质性，从而影响立法产出。我们用它来展示选举竞争的加剧如何导致社会行为的增加以及政治极化对立法活动的非线性影响。我们使用第 105 届至 110 届美国国会（1997 年至 2009 年）各届议员的社会和立法努力数据来确定并结构性地估计我们的模型。我们发现政党内部和政党之间政治家的努力之间存在着巨大的溢出效应。尽管党派之间的党派之争和偏好差异是社交的重要驱动因素，但我们的经验证据描绘了立法者非正式关系的两极分化程度低于仅从立法投票中得出的典型情况。
We develop a model of social interactions, as well as strategic interactions that depend on such social activity, and use it to measure social complementarities in the legislative process. Our model allows for partisan bias and homophily in the formation of relationships, which then impact legislative output. We use it to show how increased electoral competition can induce increased social behavior and the nonlinear effects of political polarization on legislative activity. We identify and structurally estimate our model using data on social and legislative efforts of members of each of the 105th–110th U.S. Congresses (1997–2009). We find large spillover effects in the form of complementarities between the efforts of politicians, both within and across parties. Although partisanship and preference differences between parties are significant drivers of socializing, our empirical evidence paints a less polarized picture of the informal connections of legislators than typically emerges from legislative votes alone.