Theory-driven specifications of utility theory. A reply to Kelle/Ludemann and Opp/Friedrichs
Theory-driven specifications of utility theory. A reply to Kelle/Ludemann and Opp/Friedrichs
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效用理论的理论驱动规范。
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发表时间：
1996
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通讯作者：
Siegwart Lindenberg
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作者：
Siegwart Lindenberg
如果一个理论的初始条件的假设仅仅允许该理论的应用，并且主要是经验评估的问题，那么这些假设可以是“薄的”，或者如果它们为该理论增加了决定性的内容，并且如果它们是在明确的理论指导下产生的（即使它们是经验评估的），那么这些假设也可以是“厚的"。我过去一直在争论，当我们处理社会学中的效用理论时，关于偏好和限制的假设不可能是单薄的。我把关于初始条件的厚假设称为“桥梁假设”，因为它们弥合了现实与（相对而言）空效用理论之间的差距。凯尔/卢德曼和奥普最初提出的观点是，桥梁假设应该是薄的而不是厚的。从他们最近对我在这本杂志上发表的关于桥梁假设问题的文章的评论中可以看出，他们在厚桥假设的方向上取得了很大的进展。对于效用理论的社会学应用来说，这是一个很大的进步，如果它是对这一重要问题进行更广泛和知情讨论的开始，那将是很好的。
Assumptions on initial conditions of a theory can be ''thin'' if they simply allow an application of the theory and are mainly a matter of empirical assessment, or can be ''thick'' if they are adding decisive content to the theory and if they come about under explicit theoretical guidance (even when they are empirically assessed). I had been arguing in the past that assumptions about preferences and restrictions cannot be thin when we deal with utility theory in sociology. I had called thick assumptions on initial conditions ''bridge assumptions'' because they bridge the gap between reality and a (relatively speaking) empty utility theory, Kelle/Ludemann and Opp had originally pushed the view that bridge assumptions should be thin rather than thick. As one can see from their recent comments on my last article in this journal on the matter of bridge assumptions, they have moved a good deal in the direction of thick bridge assumptions. For the sociological use of utility theory, this is a large step forward and it would be good if it were the beginning of a broader and informed discussion on this important matter.