The Effect of Retirement On Political Shirking: Evidence From Congressional Voting
The Effect of Retirement On Political Shirking: Evidence From Congressional Voting
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退休对政治逃避的影响：来自国会投票的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David N. Figlio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David N. Figlio
理性效用最大化代理人的理论表明，当连任限制被消除时，政治家应该改变他们的投票模式。然而，之前关于这个问题的实证工作并未显示出这样的关系。本文检验了这样的假设：退休的决定会导致政治投票行为的系统性变化（或“政治逃避”）。作者使用了一个多年面板数据集，其中包含比许多先前研究更多的观察结果、更精确的政治逃避责任衡量标准以及与之前工作不同的退休衡量标准。最小二乘估计产生显着的系数估计值和实质性证据，表明退休决定导致政治逃避责任。
The theory of rational utility-maximizing agents suggests that politicians should alter their voting patterns when the reelection constraint is removed. However, the previous empirical work on this issue has not shown such a relationship. This article tests the hypothesis that the decision to retire results in systematic changes in political voting behavior (or "political shirking "). The author uses a multiyearpanel data set with more observations than many prior studies, a more precise measure of political shirking, and a different measure of retirement than previous work Least squares estimation yields significant coefficient estimates and substantial evidence that the retirement decision results in political shirking.