Market Signaling with Grades
Market Signaling with Grades
复制标题
市场信号与等级
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1532846
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brett Green
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brendan Daley;Brett Green
我们考虑一个信号模型，在该模型中，接收者既观察到发送者昂贵的信号，又观察到与发送者类型相关的随机等级。在平衡中，发送者解决了使用昂贵的信号和依赖噪声等级来区分自己之间的权衡。我们得到了一个充要条件--松散地说，相对于(边际)信号成本在不同类型之间的分散程度而言，等级是足够信息的--在这种条件下，等级的存在实质上改变了均衡预测。具体地说，分离均衡在基于稳定性的改进中无法幸存。相反，预测依赖于发送者类型的先验分布。例如，对于两种类型，当分布将足够的权重放在高类型上时，它涉及完全池化，否则涉及部分池化。最后，随着分布趋于退化，均衡收敛到完全信息的结果--解决了信号文献中长期存在的悖论。
We consider a signaling model in which receivers observe both the sender's costly signal as well as a stochastic grade that is correlated with the sender's type. In equilibrium, the sender resolves the trade-off between using the costly signal versus relying on the noisy grade to distinguish himself. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition—loosely, that the grade is sufficiently informative relative to the dispersion of (marginal) signaling costs across types—under which the presence of grades substantively alters the equilibrium predictions. Specifically, separating equilibria do not survive stability-based refinements. Instead, the prediction depends on the prior distribution over the sender's type. For example, with two types it involves full pooling when the distribution places sufficient weight on the high type and partial pooling otherwise. Finally, the equilibrium converges to the complete-information outcome as the distribution tends to a degenerate one—resolving a long-standing paradox within the signaling literature.