HiQ v. LinkedIn, Clearview AI, and a New Common Law of Web Scraping
HiQ v. LinkedIn, Clearview AI, and a New Common Law of Web Scraping
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HiQ 诉 LinkedIn、Clearview AI 以及新的网页抓取普通法
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3581844
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Benjamin Sobel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Benjamin Sobel
Clearview AI面部识别丑闻是对隐私的重大侵犯，在一个特别不合时宜的时间到来。据报道，一家影子公司从社交媒体平台上收集了数十亿张公开的图像，并将其编译成一个面部识别数据库，供执法部门和私营企业使用。更糟糕的是，这起丑闻是在第九巡回法院对hiQ诉LinkedIn案做出裁决几个月后曝光的，该裁决认为抓取公共网络可能并不违反《计算机欺诈和滥用法》（CFAA）。在hiQ之前，CFAA似乎是纠正Clearview的最可靠途径。本文分析了高智商的决定的影响，位于Clearview愤怒的历史背景下，解释了为什么现有的法律的补救措施，使受害的原告几乎没有追索权，并提出了一个狭窄的侵权行为，使普通的互联网用户采取行动，对严重侵犯隐私的演员，如Clearview：侵权的恶意违反服务条款。
第一部分认为，第九巡回法院的高智商的决定标志着，至少在目前，普通法诉讼的原因，已被CFAA占主导地位的领域的reascension。第二部分表明，法院现在必须适应网络空间的可能的普通法理论的混乱，类似于法学家和隐私原告在20世纪初所考虑的紧张的财产和合同概念。它表明，现代法院，按照他们的前辈在世纪前建立的例子，可能会适当地承认一些普通法补救措施，为今天的不当行为。第三部分列举了常见的普通法索赔，认为没有既定的财产，侵权或合同索赔完全捕捉到像Clearview的行为对个人互联网用户造成的关系伤害。第四部分提出了一种新的侵权行为，恶意违反服务条款，可以为受害的原告提供适当的救济，而不牺牲理论的忠实性或理论的连贯性。
The Clearview AI facial recognition scandal is a monumental breach of privacy that arrived at a particularly inopportune time. A shadowy company reportedly scraped billions of publicly-available images from social media platforms and compiled them into a facial recognition database that it made available to law enforcement and private industry. To make matters worse, the scandal came to light just months after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in hiQ v. LinkedIn, which held that scraping the public web probably does not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Before hiQ, the CFAA would have seemed like the surest route to redress against Clearview. This Article analyzes the implications of the hiQ decision, situates the Clearview outrage in historical context, explains why existing legal remedies give aggrieved plaintiffs little to no recourse, and proposes a narrow tort to empower ordinary Internet users to take action against gross breaches of privacy by actors like Clearview: the tort of bad faith breach of terms of service.
Part I argues that the Ninth Circuit’s hiQ decision marks, at least for the time being, the reascension of common law causes of action in a field that had been dominated by the CFAA. Part II shows that the tangle of possible common law theories that courts must now adapt to cyberspace resembles the strained property and contract concepts that jurists and privacy plaintiffs reckoned with at the turn of the 20th century. It suggests that modern courts, following the example some of their predecessors set over a century ago, may properly recognize some common law remedies for present-day misconduct. Part III catalogs familiar common law claims to argue that no established property, tort, or contract claim fully captures the relational harm that conduct like Clearview’s wreaks on individual Internet users. Part IV proposes a new tort, bad faith breach of terms of service, that can provide aggrieved plaintiffs with a proper remedy without sacrificing doctrinal fidelity or theoretical coherence.