When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
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当文化不再重要时：来自奥地利和日本的联盟组建最后通牒游戏的实验证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Riedl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Akira Okada;A. Riedl
本文报告了奥地利和日本在一个实验性三人联盟形成最后通牒博弈中的跨国比较结果。实验设计允许对三个决定进行比较。(i)联盟决策，（ii） 2人和3人最后通牒子博弈中提议者的需求行为，以及（iii）这些子博弈中回应者的行为。与其他实验讨价还价环境的跨文化研究相比，我们在奥地利和日本的受试者之间没有发现任何（显著的）行为差异。我们将行为相似性主要归因于微妙的焦点和响应者竞争效应，这消除了可能的文化差异。我们的结论是，即使在讨价还价这样的环境中，文化差异可能发挥着突出的作用，这些差异的表现对人们行为的确切背景也是高度敏感的。
This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and 3-personultimatum subgames, and (iii) theresponders' behavior in these subgames. In contrast to other cross-culturalstudies in experimental bargainingenvironments we can not find any (significant) difference in behavior betweensubjects in Austria and Japan. Weattribute the behavioral similarities mainly to a subtle focal point andresponder competition effect, which wipe outpossible cultural differences. Our conclusion is that even in environments -like bargaining - where cultural differencesmay play a prominent role the show-up of these differences is highly sensitiveto the exact context in which people act.