Managing channel profits

Managing channel profits
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DOI:
10.1287/mksc.1070.0332
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发表时间:
2008-01-01
期刊:
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
Shugan, Steven M.
Shugan, Steven M.
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jeuland, Abel P.;Shugan, Steven M.

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分销渠道由不同的渠道成员组成,每个成员都有自己的决策变量。然而,每个渠道成员的决策确实会影响其他渠道成员的利润,进而影响其行动。这些决策缺乏协调会导致不良后果。例如,在简单的制造商 - 零售商 - 消费者渠道中,渠道成员在利润方面不协调和独立的决策会导致消费者支付的价格高于决策协调时的价格。此外,随之而来的次优销量会导致制造商和零售商的利润降低。 本文探讨了渠道协调中固有的问题。我们探讨以下问题:渠道协调的效果是什么?渠道中缺乏协调的原因是什么?实现渠道协调有多困难?存在哪些可以实现渠道协调的机制?这些机制的优势和劣势是什么?非价格变量(例如,制造商广告、零售商货架空间)在协调中起什么作用?缺乏协调是否会影响店内实验的规范含义?数量折扣能否成为一种协调机制?一些营销做法实际上是否是变相的数量折扣? 我们回顾了相关文献,并提出一个简单的公式来说明协调问题的根源。然后,我们推导出能使渠道利润最优的数量折扣方案的形式。
A channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables. However, each channel member's decisions do affect the other channel members' profits and, as a consequence, actions. A lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences. For example, in the simple manufacturer-retailer-consumer channel, uncoordinated and independent channel members' decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated. In addition, the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer.This paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination. We address the following questions.What is the effect of channel coordination?What causes a lack of coordination in the channel?How difficult is it to achieve channel coordination?What mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination?What are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism?What is the role of nonprice variables (e.g., manufacturer advertising, retailer shelf-space) in coordination?Does the lackof coordination affect normative implications from in-store experimentation?Can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism?Are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts?We review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem. We then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits.