Channel Coordination with a Risk‐Neutral Supplier and a Downside‐Risk‐Averse Retailer
Channel Coordination with a Risk‐Neutral Supplier and a Downside‐Risk‐Averse Retailer
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00011.x
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发表时间：
2005-03
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
X. Gan;S. Sethi;Houmin Yan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Gan;S. Sethi;Houmin Yan
我们研究了由风险中性供应商和下行风险厌恶零售商组成的供应链如何通过供应合同进行协调。我们表明，标准的回购或收入分享合同可能不会协调这样的渠道。利用前面提出的供应链协调的定义，我们设计了一种风险分担契约，它为零售商提供期望的下行保护，向代理商提供各自的保留利润，并完成渠道协调。
We investigate how a supply chain involving a risk‐neutral supplier and a downside‐risk‐averse retailer can be coordinated with a supply contract. We show that the standard buy‐back or revenue‐sharing contracts may not coordinate such a channel. Using a definition of coordination of supply chains proposed earlier by the authors, we design a risk‐sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination.