The Nature of Ownership,Corporate Governance and Real Earnings Management
The Nature of Ownership,Corporate Governance and Real Earnings Management
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
G. Mingrun;Y. Ji-wei;Y. Nutao
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作者：
G. Mingrun;Y. Ji-wei;Y. Nutao
本文首先从我国上市公司的股权结构出发，考察了国有公司和非国有公司的真实盈余管理行为。结果表明，国有企业的真实盈余管理显著高于非国有企业。这一发现是合理的，因为国有企业高度集中的股权结构错综复杂，更严重的问题是小股东的利益占用，为了隐藏控制利益，国有企业的管理者或控股股东可能有强烈的动机进行更多的盈余管理，包括真实盈余管理，以掩盖公司的真实业绩。另一方面，国有企业的破产风险通常较低，国有企业的管理者通常是现任或前任政府官员，他们的晋升和薪酬更多的是由各种政治和社会目标来衡量，而不是由经营和财务业绩来衡量。因此，如果国有企业的真实盈余管理做得过多，那么国有企业的管理者可能不会太在意其对经营绩效的负面影响。在此基础上，本文从所有权性质的角度考察了公司治理机制与真实盈余管理的关系。本研究以2001-2010年的中国资本市场数据为研究对象，具体分析了董事会独立性、公司治理规模和董事会规模对管理者真实盈余管理的影响。研究结果首先表明，以国有企业为样本，董事会规模和CG_index与真实盈余管理呈负相关，而独立审计与真实盈余管理的相关性不显著。由于中国审计市场竞争激烈，独立审计对国有企业的真实盈余管理没有太大意义。独立审计师可能会牺牲审计质量来留住非常重要的客户。其次，我们发现公司内部治理机制与真实盈余管理之间没有显著的关系，而独立审计和独立董事比例等公司外部治理机制与非政府控股公司的真实盈余管理呈负相关。综上所述，研究结果表明，在考虑所有权性质的情况下，公司治理机制对真实盈余管理的影响可能不同。
From the point of the ownership of the Chinese listed company,this paper firstly examines the real earnings management behavior of the state-owned company and nonstate -owned company.Our result shows that state-owned company did significant more real earnings management than the non-state-owned company.This finding is reasonable since the highly concentrated ownership of the state-owned enterprise many intricate more serious problems of the benefit occupation of small shareholders,to conceal the controlling benefits, the managers or controlling shareholders of the state-owned enterprises may have strong incentive to do more earnings management including real earnings management to mask true performance of company.On another hand,state-owned companies normally have low bankruptcy risk and the managers of State-owned enterprises are usually current or former government bureaucrats,their promotion and compensation are measured more by various political and social objectives than by operating and financial performance.Thus the managers of stateowned enterprises may less care of the negative effect on the operating performance if too more real earnings management has done. Based on the previous finding",then we examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and real earnings management from the perspective of the nature of own- ership.This study is focuses on Chinese capital market data which ranges from 2001—2010 and specifically to analyze how the independence of board of directors,the magnitude of corporate governance and the size of board influence the real earnings management of the managers. The result firstly suggests that the board of size and the CG_index is negatively correlated with real earnings management but the independent audit is not significantly correlated with real earnings management for the sample of the state-owned enterprises.The independent audit has no significance on the real earnings management of the state-owned enterprise possibly due to the fierce competition of the Chinese auditing market.The independent auditor may compromise the quality of auditing to retain very important customer.Secondly,we find no significant relationship between the inside corporate governance mechanism with real earnings management but the outside corporate governance mechanisms such as the independent audit and the percentage of independent directors are negatively correlated with real earnings management for the non-government-controlled companies.In sum,the result suggests the corporate governance mechanisms may have different effect on real earnings management when considering the nature of the ownership.