Quantal response equilibria in a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma and step-level public goods games with binary decision
Quantal response equilibria in a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma and step-level public goods games with binary decision
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DOI：
10.1007/s40844-017-0081-6
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Toshiji Kawagoe;Taisuke Matsubae;Hirokazu Takizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toshiji Kawagoe;Taisuke Matsubae;Hirokazu Takizawa
本文描述了广义志愿者困境博弈的均衡特征，该博弈是志愿者困境与二元决策的阶梯级公共产品博弈的结合。我们还研究了被广泛接受的有限理性模型的解释力，量子反应均衡（QRE）和水平分析。结果表明，QRE模型在解释实验数据方面具有较好的性能。
The present paper characterizes equilibria of a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma game, which is an integration of the Volunteer’s Dilemma and the step-level public goods games with binary decision. We also examined the explanatory power of widely accepted models with bounded rationality, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and level-kanalysis. It is shown that the performance of the QRE model is better in explaining laboratory data.