Side-channel Resistant Implementations of a Novel Lightweight Authenticated Cipher with Application to Hardware Security
Side-channel Resistant Implementations of a Novel Lightweight Authenticated Cipher with Application to Hardware Security
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新型轻量级认证密码的抗侧信道实现及其在硬件安全中的应用
DOI：
10.1145/3453688.3461761
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gaj, Kris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Abdulgadir, Abubakr;Lin, Sammy;Farahmand, Farnoud;Kaps, Jens-Peter;Gaj, Kris
轻量级认证密码在许多资源受限的应用程序中至关重要，包括硬件安全。为了保护知识产权 (IP) 免遭盗窃和逆向工程，人们开发了多种混淆方法。此类方案的一个重要组成部分是需要混淆密钥的保密性和真实性。此类密钥可能需要通过未受保护的通道进行交换，并且尝试使用旁道攻击来恢复它们。然而，使用当前的 AES-GCM 标准来保护密钥交换需要大量的面积和功率开销。 NIST 目前正在协调标准化流程，为资源受限的应用程序选择轻量级算法。尽管针对密码分析的安全性至关重要，但成本、性能和对侧信道攻击的抵抗力是最重要的选择标准。由于防止侧信道攻击的成本是算法的函数，因此量化该成本对于估计其在实际应用中的成本和性能是必要的。在这项工作中，我们研究了经过验证的密码 TinyJAMBU 的抗侧信道轻量级实现，TinyJAMBU 是当前 NIST LWC 标准化过程中的十个决赛入围者之一。我们的结果表明，这些实现实现了针对侧信道攻击的强大安全性，同时使面积和功耗显着低于使用当前标准的情况。
Lightweight authenticated ciphers are crucial in many resource-constrained applications, including hardware security. To protect Intellectual Property (IPs) from theft and reverse-engineering, multiple obfuscation methods have been developed. An essential component of such schemes is the need for secrecy and authenticity of the obfuscation keys. Such keys may need to be exchanged through the unprotected channels, and their recovery attempted using side-channel attacks. However, the use of the current AES-GCM standard to protected key exchange requires a substantial area and power overhead. NIST is currently coordinating a standardization process to select lightweight algorithms for resource-constrained applications. Although security against cryptanalysis is paramount, cost, performance, and resistance to side-channel attacks are among the most important selection criteria. Since the cost of protection against side-channel attacks is a function of the algorithm, quantifying this cost is necessary for estimating its cost and performance in real-world applications. In this work, we investigate side-channel resistant lightweight implementations of an authenticated cipher TinyJAMBU, one of ten finalists in the current NIST LWC standardization process. Our results demonstrate that these implementations achieve robust security against side-channel attacks while keeping the area and power consumption significantly lower than it is possible using the current standards.
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DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Hannes Gross
通讯作者：
Hannes Gross
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
--
影响因子：
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作者：
K. Z. Azar;Farnoud Farahmand;Hadi Mardani Kamali;Shervin Roshanisefat;H. Homayoun;William Diehl;K. Gaj;Avesta Sasan
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K. Z. Azar;Farnoud Farahmand;Hadi Mardani Kamali;Shervin Roshanisefat;H. Homayoun;William Diehl;K. Gaj;Avesta Sasan
用于评估轻量级认证密码的硬件实现的开源平台
DOI：
10.1109/reconfig48160.2019.8994788
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
Mexico
影响因子：
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作者：
Abdulgadir, Abubakr;Diehl, William;Kaps, Jens-Peter
通讯作者：
Kaps, Jens-Peter
付出代价的侧信道阻力：基于 ARX 的认证加密的比较
DOI：
10.1109/fpl50879.2020.00040
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
2020 30th International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL
影响因子：
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作者：
Coleman, Flora;Rezvani, Behnaz;Sachin, Sachin;Diehl, William
通讯作者：
Diehl, William
Minerva：自动化硬件优化工具
DOI：
10.1109/reconfig.2017.8279804
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
2017 International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig)
影响因子：
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作者：
Farnoud Farahmand;Ahmed Ferozpuri;William Diehl;K. Gaj
通讯作者：
K. Gaj