Managerial Power and Succession: SBU Managers of Mutual Funds
Managerial Power and Succession: SBU Managers of Mutual Funds
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管理权力和继任：共同基金的 SBU 经理
DOI：
10.1177/0170840699202001
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
H. Rao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Drazin;H. Rao
本研究应用绩效-权力-继任模型分析事业单位经理人继任的前因。我们假设，六个独特的SBU经理角色的社会政治因素将有重大影响的继承，也将缓和的性能继承关系。开放式共同基金的投资组合经理收集的数据显示，任期的主要影响，收入控制的一部分，管理退出和进入，以及继承的杠杆作用，但没有发现支持市场份额。中介效应被发现的任期，控制的收入，市场份额，杠杆，和管理退出的一部分，但没有管理条目。我们讨论了这些研究结果的影响，扩大文献的高管继任，包括SBU经理。
This study applies the performance-power-succession model to the analysis of the antecedents of succession among SBU managers. We hypothesize that six socio-political factors unique to the SBU manager role will have major effects on succession and will also moderate the performance-succession relationship. Data gathered on portfolio managers of open-ended mutual funds shows the main effects of tenure, portion of revenues controlled, managerial exits and entries, and leverage on succession, but reveals no support for market share. Mediating effects were found for tenure, portion of revenues controlled, market share, leverage, and managerial exits, but not for managerial entries. We discuss the implications of these findings for extending the literature on executive succession to include SBU managers.