A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2013.12.017
复制
发表时间：
2014-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Jørgensen;G. Zaccour
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Jørgensen;G. Zaccour
本文运用博弈论的方法对营销渠道(供应链)中的合作广告进行了文献综述。特别是在过去的十年里，这些文献得到了相当大的扩展，并研究了静态和动态的设置。调查分为两个主要部分。第一种是只有一家供应商和一家经销商的简单营销渠道。第二部分研究的是具有多个供应商和经销商的复杂结构的营销渠道。在第一部分中，我们发现许多结果从静态环境传递到动态环境。我们还发现，关于静态模型的工作是相当同质的，因为大多数论文采用了相同的基本消费者需求描述，并讨论了相同的情况，即垂直整合和具有同时或顺序动作的非合作博弈。对合作广告的动态问题的研究也显示出一些相似之处。第二部分表明，在供应链的任一层或两层包含水平交互的模型比假设它不存在的模型要少得多。合作广告项目的参与率取决于品牌间和品牌内部的竞争，参与并不总是符合营销渠道中公司的最佳利益。
The paper surveys the literature on cooperative advertising in marketing channels (supply chains) using game theoretic methods. During the last decade, in particular, this literature has expanded considerably and has studied static as well as dynamic settings. The survey is divided into two main parts. The first one deals with simple marketing channels having one supplier and one reseller only. The second one covers marketing channels of a more complex structure, having more than one supplier and/or reseller.In the first part we find that a number of results carry over from static to dynamic environments. We also find that the work on static models is quite homogeneous, in the sense that most papers employ the same basic consumer demand specification and address the same situations of vertical integration and noncooperative games with simultaneous or sequential actions. The work on dynamic problems of cooperative advertising also shows some similarities.The second part shows that models incorporating horizontal interaction on either or both layers of the supply chain are much less numerous than those supposing its absence. Participation rates in co-op advertising programs depend on inter- and intra-brand competition, and participation may not always be in the best interest of the firms in the marketing channel.