How Political Parties Follow the Partisans’ Preferences: Simulation Based on Statistical Estimates of Japanese Voting Behavior
How Political Parties Follow the Partisans’ Preferences: Simulation Based on Statistical Estimates of Japanese Voting Behavior
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政党如何遵循党派偏好：基于日本投票行为统计估计的模拟
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2641705
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Koji Yamamoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Koji Yamamoto
为了从理论上揭示“党派投票”的程度与政党的“党派定位”的程度之间的关系，本文使用日本的数据进行了分析。本文的研究结果对于政党如何以及何时能够控制政党具有一定的启示意义，这是民主控制和民主代表制的一个方面。对一个政党过于忠诚的党派人士的偏好可以被政党本身忽略，因为在这种情况下，政党永远不需要担心失去他们的选票。另一方面，党派投票少的选民不一定更好地代表政党。这是因为，如果一个政党不能依靠其党派的选票，而有其他对该党有吸引力的替代选民，那么它可能会放弃前者。因此，党派投票的程度和政党的党派定位的程度之间的关系可以是单调的或“U”形。首先，统计估计了日本人投票行为的模型。其次，在一些Downsian假设下，计算了各方均衡。该方法是一种基于上述估计中获得的估计的模拟，这应该增强结果的真实性。结果表明，假设在一定条件下可以成立。关键因素似乎是党派沿着政策维度的配置和党派的规模。这种“U”型关系表明，为了加强对党的控制，党应该表现出既不容易也不很难吸引选民。
In order to reveal the theoretical relationship between the extent of "partisan voting" and the extent of the party's "partisan positioning" along a policy dimension, this paper reports on analyses using Japan's data. The results will have implications about how and when partisans can control the parties, which is one aspect of democratic control and representation.The hypotheses are drawn as follow. The preference of the partisans too loyal to a party can be neglected by the party itself, because in this situation the party never needs to fear any loss of the vote from them. On the other hand, the voters of little partisan voting may not necessarily be better represented by parties. This is because, if a party can't rely on the vote from its partisans and there are other alternative voters attractive to the party, then it may abandon the former. Thus, the relationship between the extent of the partisan voting and the extent of the party's partisan positioning can be monotonic or "U"-shaped.The analyses consist of two parts. Firstly, a model of Japanese voting behavior is statistically estimated. Secondly, with some Downsian assumptions, party equilibria are computed. This method is a kind of simulation based on the estimates obtained in the estimation above, which should enhance reality of the results.The results show that the hypotheses can hold under certain conditions. The key factors seem to be the configuration of the partisans along policy dimension and the size of the partisans. The "U"-shaped relationship suggests that, in order to enhance control over the party, the voters should appear neither very easy nor very hard for the party to seduce.