Controlling Scarce Working Time in a Multi-task Incentive Problem§
Controlling Scarce Working Time in a Multi-task Incentive Problem§
复制标题
控制多任务激励问题中的稀缺工作时间§
DOI：
10.1080/09638180.2017.1408478
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jens Robert Schöndube
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Mauch;Jens Robert Schöndube
尽管工作时间是企业最稀缺的资源之一，但如何最优地控制它却很少有深入的研究。本文分析了在一个合同问题中，稀缺的工作时间在两个任务上的最优分配问题。由于每一个小时专门用于一个特定的任务是不适用于其他任务，反之亦然，代理帐户的机会成本时，分配他的时间的任务。我们分析这种权衡假设代理人的贡献是不可收缩的，这样的合同必须写在一个替代措施的基础上。时间稀缺限制了总产出。但同时也改变了智能体对性能敏感度较高的任务的注意力。因此，通过增加激励系数，委托人诱导代理人将时间从不太敏感的任务转移到更敏感的任务。我们的论文的主要贡献是，我们表明，时间稀缺性可以提高一致性的代理人的行为与委托人的目标。在某些条件下，在时间稀缺的情况下，努力的更好协调抵消了产出的减少，增加了机构的盈余。
Even though working time is one of the firm's scarcest resources, there are very few insights into how to optimally control it. In this paper we analyze the optimal allocation of scarce working time to two tasks in a contracting problem. Since each hour devoted to one specific task is not available for the other task, and vice versa, the agent accounts for opportunity cost when allocating his time to the tasks. We analyze this trade-off assuming that the agent's contribution is not contractible, such that a contract must be written based on an alternative measure. Time scarcity restricts total output. At the same time, however, it changes the agent's focus of attention towards the task with the higher performance sensitivity. Thus, by increasing the incentive coefficient the principal induces the agent to shift time from the less sensitive to the more sensitive task. The main contribution of our paper is that we show that time scarcity can improve the congruence of the agent's behavior with the principal's objectives. Under certain conditions an improved alignment of effort under time scarcity offsets the reduction of output and increases the agency's surplus.