Social Ranking Problem Based on Rankings of Restricted Coalitions

Social Ranking Problem Based on Rankings of Restricted Coalitions
复制标题

基于受限联盟排名的社会排名问题

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-77208-6_5
复制
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Contemporary Issues in Group Decision and Negotiation. GDN 2021. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Horita Masahide
Horita Masahide
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Suzuki Takahiro;Horita Masahide

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

对个人的评价;如工人、科研人员、团队运动运动员等;通常是基于他们联盟的表现。本文将研究所谓有序的社会等级问题;即根据个体联盟的序数排名来确定个体的序数排名。更具体地说,我们研究了具有受限联合域的问题。先前已经证明,支配地位(DOM)(如果一个替代方案在每次其他条件相同的比较中赢得另一个替代方案,社会排名必须以这种方式判断它们)和无关联盟的独立性(IIC)将产生联盟规模的独裁统治。我们将首先证明,在任何联盟域下,只要任意两个个体可以比较,就会产生类似的独裁统治,因为DOM和IIC较弱。最后,我们将研究整个联盟排序的扩展问题,例如确定某些奖励的最佳联盟,并将证明这样一个独裁者也必须在这个扩展框架内产生。
Evaluations of individuals; such as workers, researchers, team-sports athletes, etc.; are often based on the performance of their coalitions. The present paper will study the so-called ordinal social ranking problem; i.e., to determine the ordinal ranking of individuals according to the ordinal rankings of their coalitions. To be more specific, we study the problem with restricted domain of coalitions. It has earlier been proven that dominance (DOM) (if an alternative wins another alternative in every ceteris paribus comparison, social ranking must judge them in that way) and independence of irrelevant coalitions (IIC) will generate a dictatorship of coalition sizes. We will first prove that a similar dictatorship is generated as a result of weak DOM and IIC, under any domain of coalitions, as long as any two individuals can be compared ceterris paribus. Finally, we will study an extended problem for the ranking of the whole coalitions, e.g., determining the best coalitions for some award, and will prove that such a dictator must also be generated within this extended framework.
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1161-1
发表时间: 2019-04-01
影响因子: 0.9
作者:
Bernardi, Giulia;Lucchetti, Roberto;Moretti, Stefano
通讯作者: Moretti, Stefano