Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
复制标题
可行的联合后验信念
DOI:
10.1145/3391403.3399505
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发表时间:
2021
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Tamuz, O
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Arieli, I.;Babichenko, Y.;Sandomirskiy, F.;Tamuz, O
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann’s agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a “no-trade” condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.
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