The Norwegian Internet Voting Protocol
The Norwegian Internet Voting Protocol
复制标题
挪威互联网投票协议
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_1
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kristian Gjøsteen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kristian Gjøsteen
挪威政府将在 2011 年地方政府选举期间试行互联网远程投票。将使用一种新的加密投票协议，其中所谓的返回码允许选民验证他们的选票是否将被计为已投票。本文讨论了加密协议的一个稍微简化的版本。简化协议的描述和分析包含用于构建和分析完整协议的大部分想法和概念。特别是，简化协议使用完整协议的新颖方法来生成返回码。协议的安全性依赖于类似于决策 Diffie-Hellman 的新颖硬度假设。虽然 DDH 声称非循环群的随机子群与整个群不可区分，但我们的假设与某些特殊子群的不可区分性有关。我们详细讨论这个问题。
The Norwegian government will run a trial of internet remote voting during the 2011 local government elections. A new cryptographic voting protocol will be used, where so-called return codes allow voters to verify that their ballots will be counted as cast.This paper discusses a slightly simplified version of the cryptographic protocol. The description and analysis of the simplified protocol contains most of the ideas and concepts used to build and analyse the full protocol. In particular, the simplified protocol uses the full protocol’s novel method for generating the return codes.The security of the protocol relies on a novel hardness assumption similar to Decision Diffie-Hellman. While DDH is a claim that a random subgroup of a non-cyclic group is indistinguishable from the whole group, our assumption is related to the indistinguishability of certain special subgroups. We discuss this question in some detail.