Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration
Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration
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信息不对称、信息外部性和效率：以石油勘探为例
DOI：
10.2307/2555687
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Kovenock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Hendricks;D. Kovenock
在这篇文章中，我们研究了私人信息和信息外部性对石油勘探投资事后效率的影响。我们表明，如果公司认为该地区可能含有相当大的石油储备，则往往会发生过多的钻探，而如果相反，则会发生过少的钻探。与明确界定的信息外部性产权进行讨价还价可以消除投资不足，但过度投资仍然是一个问题，因为企业有动机不披露其私人信息。
In this article we examine the effect of private information and information externalties on the ex post efficiency of investment in oil exploration. We show that too much drilling tends to occur if firms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil, and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true. Bargaining with well-defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment, but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information.